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CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE
LOWER COURTS: THE JUSTICE BARRETT
EDITION
AARON L. NIELSON* & PAUL STANCIL**
Now that Justice Amy Coney Barrett has joined the United States
Supreme Court, most observers predict the law will shift on many issues. This
common view presumably contains at least some truth. The conventional
wisdom, however, overlooks something important: the Supreme Court’s
ability to shift the law is constrained by the cases presented to it and how
they are presented. Lower courts are thus an important part of the equation.
Elsewhere, the authors have offered a model of certiorari to
demonstrate how lower courts in theory can design their decisions to evade
Supreme Court review; they also explain why such “cert-proofing” tools are
problematic. In this Article, they apply that model to civil rights litigation
involving qualified immunity, with particular focus on Justice Barrett’s
confirmation. On the assumption that Barrett’s views will be more like those
of the late Justice Antonin Scalia (for whom she clerked) than those of the
late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (whom she replaced), the model predicts
lower court judges who do not share Barrett’s views will be tempted, at the
margins, to try to evade Supreme Court review. This temptation may be
particularly strong for cases that involve qualified immunity, which present
unique cert-proofing opportunities. At the same time, the model predicts
judges who do share Barrett’s views will be less inclined to use such tools.
Thus, although there likely will be no meaningful change in how most cases
are decided, the upshot of the model is that in marginal cases it is possible
that lower courts will change how they address civil rights litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Amy Comey Barrett’s confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court
has the legal world buzzing about changes to come in U.S. law.1
Conventional wisdom holds that Justice Brett Kavanaugh may be the Court’s
new “swing justice” and that Chief Justice John Roberts has suffered a loss
of power.2 Accordingly, many scholars and commentators predict that the
law will shift on many issues. After all, the theory goes, with “five staunch
conservatives and one moderate conservative,” it is “much more difficult for
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan to be in the majority,” which could
potentially shut down a path to “progressive change.”3
1

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The New Supreme Court, CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE (Jan.
2021), https://www.californialawreview.org/the-new-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/PHS3ZQRF]; How Amy Coney Barrett Would Reshape the Court—And the Country, POLITICO
(Sept. 26, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/26/amybarrett-scotus-legal-experts-422028 [https://perma.cc/7CFZ-ZHUW] (listing predictions from
more than “two dozen legal thinkers”).
2
See, e.g., Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Cases Where Amy Coney Barrett’s Presence
on the Supreme Court Could Make a Difference Immediately, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 26,
2020),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-kind-of-supreme-court-justice-will-amyconey-barrett-be/ [https://perma.cc/JUP8-SCYG] (explaining that “Justice Brett Kavanaugh
[c]ould replace Roberts as the court’s new median justice, which could lead to a significant
rightward turn on the court . . . .”); Liz Mineo, Do Justices Really Set Aside Personal Beliefs?
Nope, Legal Scholar Says, HARV. GAZETTE (Oct. 15, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette
/story/2020/10/legal-scholar-warns-of-potential-supreme-court-changes/ [https://perma.cc/48
BA-93P3] (quoting Michael Karman as predicting that “Roberts will, in a sense, become
irrelevant” and that “Brett Kavanaugh will probably be the swing justice”).
3
Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
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This conventional wisdom likely contains some truth. Assuming that
Barrett’s views will generally be more like Justice Antonin Scalia’s, for
whom she clerked, than Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s, whom she replaced,
one should expect doctrine to shift with all else being equal.4
But the full impact of Justice Barrett’s confirmation is not so easy to
predict—and that is true even if predictions about her approach to cases prove
accurate. The American judicial system is dynamic. That is, changes at the
top may prompt reactions by lower court judges,5 whose own life tenure
insulates them from the most direct forms of top-down “discipline” or
“control” by the Supreme Court.6 Thus, whatever the new equilibrium
Barrett’s confirmation creates, that equilibrium presumably will be a product
not only of the Supreme Court’s new views, but also of the lower courts’
responses to those new views.
Our forthcoming article entitled Gaming Certiorari uses game theory to
model the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts in
an age of certiorari.7 As Gaming Certiorari explains when the views of lower
courts and the Supreme Court diverge, lower court judges may be tempted to
use “cert-proofing” tools to prevent Supreme Court review, including issuing
unpublished opinions with cursory analysis, fact-bound rationales, or
alternative holdings.8 Perhaps more counterintuitively, our model also
suggests that lower court judges may combine those tools with substantive
outcomes that in a sense “split the difference” between what the lower court
judges want and what a majority on the Supreme Court wants—in other
4
Of course, not everything else is equal. Whenever a justice joins the Supreme Court, the
institution changes.
5
As used here, “lower court judges” refers to judges on courts whose decisions the U.S.
Supreme Court can review and reverse. Primarily, these judges are found on federal appellate
courts and state supreme courts. To be clear, when the Supreme Court reverses a lower court’s
decision, it does not mean that the lower court was wrong—the Supreme Court makes
mistakes. But to the extent that the judiciary is hierarchical, someone has to be on top. Cf.
Jonathan Remy Nash, Judicial Laterals, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (2017) (“Let us begin
with the uncontroversial proposition that most U.S. judiciaries share a common internal
hierarchical structure . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
6
Terms like “discipline” and “control” imply a principal-agent relationship between the
Supreme Court and lower courts. Because the Supreme Court is generally the ultimate arbiter
of “what the law is” as to constitutional and federal statutory matters, we accept that
relationship for the purposes of our model. Whether the “principal-agent” paradigm is always
appropriate is a far more difficult issue.
7
See Aaron L. Nielson & Paul Stancil, Gaming Certiorari, 170 PENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2022) (using game theory to model certiorari and the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the lower courts).
8
See id. at Section II.C.
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words, substantive and non-substantive aspects of an opinion can be traded
off of each other.9 To be sure, Gaming Certiorari does not definitively claim
that lower court judges try to evade review in this way, much less that it is
even possible in every case. Instead, the Article attempts to show that it is
theoretically possible to cert-proof some decisions and then explores the
implications.10 It also explains why cert-proofing is problematic, with special
focus on the harm that it can impose on third parties.11
This Article uses our model for a different purpose: to explore what
Justice Barrett’s confirmation may broadly mean for civil rights litigation in
the United States. We focus on this particular context for four reasons:
1. Because civil rights litigation is often12 marked by sharp
disagreement, our model may be especially relevant in this
context. After all, cert-proofing should be most attractive for
issues that judges care most about.
2. Because Justice Barrett’s views likely will be different from
Justice Ginsburg’s views for a relatively large number of civil
rights issues,13 lower courts have special reason to expect the
Supreme Court with Barrett will resolve such cases differently.
3. Because President Biden will likely appoint many lower court
judges,14 the “gap” between the views of the lower courts and
those of the Supreme Court presumably will widen over the
next few years for certain types of cases. Thus, to the extent that

9

See id. at Section II.D.
See id. at Sections II.C., IV.
11
See id. at Part IV.
12
This point should not be overstated. Even at the Supreme Court, many civil rights suits
are resolved unanimously or nearly unanimously. See, e.g., Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, No.
20-1539, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2021) (per curiam) (reversing decision denying qualified
immunity with no recorded dissent); City of Tahlequah v. Bond, No. 20-1668, slip op. at 5
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2021) (per curiam) (same); Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per
curiam) (reversing decision awarding qualified immunity with only one recorded dissent);
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 593 (2018) (unanimously reversing decision
that denied qualified immunity).
13
See infra p. 9.
14
See, e.g., Madison Alder, Georgia Opens Path for Bold Push on Judges—If Biden
Wants It, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2021, 3:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/georgia-opens-path-for-bold-push-on-judges-if-biden-wants-it [https://perma.cc/P8ZLZY3Q] (explaining that although only one Supreme Court vacancy seems likely, Justice
Breyer’s seat, “[a]t least 38 Democratic-appointed appeals court judges will be eligible to take
a form of semi-retirement known as senior status in January, according to a Bloomberg Law
analysis of Federal Judicial Center data”).
10
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cert-proofing occurs in the real world, a focus on civil rights
litigation may be a good place to find it.
4. Because civil rights litigation often involves qualified
immunity,15 it carries with it a unique cert-proofing tool. The
test for qualified immunity has two steps (was the right violated,
and if so, was the right clearly established)16 which lower courts
can apply in a discretionary manner (they can say that even
assuming the right exists, it was not clearly established, and
thus dismiss the claim, or they can say that the right was not
clearly established but then clearly establish it for future
cases).17 This unique tool further complicates the relationship
between the lower courts and the Supreme Court.18
Our model predicts that Justice Barrett’s confirmation will, at the
margins, result in some lower court judges—those who do not agree with the
views of the new Supreme Court majority—being more tempted to use certproofing tools. Additionally, to the extent that a lower court decision that
rules against a civil rights plaintiff but also clearly establishes the law for
future plaintiffs is less cert worthy than a decision that rules in favor of the
plaintiff,19 our model also predicts at the margins that judges who disagree
with the Supreme Court will be more tempted to issue decisions that deny
immunity but that clearly establish the right going forward. By contrast,
lower court judges with views more aligned with the new Supreme Court
majority’s views will also face different incentives, including reduced
temptation to use cert-proofing tools. To the extent that our model at least
sometimes accurately captures incentives and further that sometimes judges
15

See infra pp. 5–8.
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
17
See id. at 236.
18
Cf. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55,
119 (2016).
19
As a formal matter, review is possible in such a case. The plaintiff, after all, is free to
petition for certiorari, but to prevail, the plaintiff must show not only a rights violation, but
also that the right at issue was clearly established. This requirement to establish two
propositions can create “vehicle” issues for a certiorari petition. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition
at 14, Harris v. Williamson County, 141 S. Ct. 849 (2020) (No. 20-353) (raising this objection
as a reason to deny certiorari). To be sure, sometimes even if the lower court granted qualified
immunity, defendants can still obtain review if they can show that they will be sufficiently
affected by the new rule going forward. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 708 (2011).
Nevertheless, it is surely more difficult for defendants to obtain such review than when the
lower court rejects qualified immunity. See, e.g., Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090,
1093 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that decisions granting immunity to a government official
but establishing the law going forward may be “effectively, cert-proof”).
16
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in fact respond to those incentives, the upshot should be that civil rights
litigation will change, even without the Supreme Court itself resolving cases
differently.
To be clear, we do not wish to overstate our position. Like any model,
ours has limitations, even to the extent that our model reflects the real world.
Moreover, our predictions still are only at the margins. In most cases, nothing
should change. Even so, there is at least some reason to predict that how
lower courts decide civil rights cases sometimes may change—which should
matter to those who study civil rights in general and qualified immunity in
particular.
Part I briefly discuss the basics of civil rights litigation—including
qualified immunity—and explores how Justice Barrett’s views may diverge
from the late Justice Ginsburg’s. Part II briefly explains our model from
Gaming Certiorari and its limitations. Then, Part III applies our model to
civil rights litigation to explore what Justice Barrett’s confirmation could
mean for lower court decision-making.
I. SOME NECESSARY BACKGROUND
To understand what Justice Barrett’s confirmation might mean for civil
rights litigation in the lower courts, it is necessary to understand at least three
things: (i) the basics of civil rights litigation, including qualified immunity;
(ii) qualified immunity’s discretionary order-of-operations; and (iii) Barrett’s
substantive views—to the extent anyone knows them.
A. CAUSES OF ACTION AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Civil rights litigation is the subject of a great deal of scholarship. Yet,
what falls within the term “civil rights” is complicated. Every aspect of the
law can affect individuals20—from contracts to evidence to property to
securities regulation. This Article uses the term “civil rights” to refer to
constitutional rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for state officers)21

20
See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1633, 1635–36 (2017) (explaining how civil procedure implicates questions of equality and
justice).
21
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 can be used to enforce more than just constitutional
rights. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005) (explaining
that § 1983 “authorizes suits to enforce individual rights under federal statutes as well as the
Constitution” but that it “does not provide an avenue for relief every time a state actor violates
a federal law”). Here, we do not address the murky field of when § 1983 applies to violations
of statutory rights. See id. at 127 (“The statute books are too many, federal laws too diverse,
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and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(for federal officers).22 Although this definition is underinclusive, other
scholars use it23 and it works here for illustrative purposes.
Section 1983 and Bivens are the “backbone of modern civil rights
litigation” because they allow individuals to seek damages.24 When
government officials violate an individual’s federal constitutional rights, that
individual sometimes can sue those officials in their individual capacities for
monetary relief, which compensates the injured person and creates
disincentives for officials to violate rights more generally. 25 Although aspects
of § 1983 and Bivens causes of action are debated—Bivens, for example, is
an implied cause of action,26 and the Supreme Court has arguably improperly
expanded § 1983’s scope in some ways27 while arguably wrongly limiting it
in others28—they are nonetheless relatively common paths to federal court.29
Both § 1983 and Bivens are also subject to a qualified immunity
defense.30 Because of qualified immunity, a plaintiff seeking damages must

and their purposes too complex for any legal formula to provide more than general guidance.”)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
22
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23
See, e.g., Laura E. Flenniken, No More Plain Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 DENV. U.
L. REV. 477, 479 n.13 (1994) (explaining that “[c]onstitutional tort litigation is a subset of
civil rights litigation [that] refers to § 1983 actions and similar suits brought against federal
actors pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.”).
24
Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2015).
25
See, e.g., id. Notably, § 1983 also sometimes authorizes suits against municipalities.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (allowing suit where “official
municipal policy” is unlawful). We do not directly address such suits here.
26
See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“Given the notable change in
the Court’s approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made
clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”).
27
See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
§ 1983 that the Court created in 1961 bears scant resemblance to what Congress enacted
almost a century earlier.”).
28
See, e.g., Katherine Mims Crocker, Reconsidering Section 1983’s Nonabrogation of
Sovereign Immunity, 73 FLA. L. REV. 523, 525 (2021) (arguing that the Supreme Court
wrongly held that states are not subject to suit under § 1983).
29
See, e.g., U.S. CTS., U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENDED, BY NATURE OF
SUIT AND DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2020 1 tbl.C-3,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c3_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8W37-3J8S].
30
See, e.g., Andrea Craig Armstrong, Prison Medical Deaths and Qualified Immunity,
112 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 79, 94 (2022); Julio Pereyra, Ziglar v. Abassi and Its Effect
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prove not only that the official violated a constitutional right, but also that
the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.31 To be clearly
established, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the
officer’s conduct ‘beyond debate’” such that “all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law” are immune.32 Thus, “[i]t is not
enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent,” but instead
“precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply” which
typically requires either “‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust consensus of
cases of persuasive authority.’”33 Due to this high standard, “violations of
federal civil rights regularly go without a federal remedy.”34
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S DISCRETIONARY ORDER-OFOPERATIONS

Since 2009, qualified immunity has also had an unusual wrinkle—if it
wishes to do so, sometimes a court can create “clearly established” law going
forward even though it will not benefit the plaintiff in the litigation.
In Pearson v. Callahan,35 the Supreme Court confronted a puzzle.
Recall that a civil rights litigant must show two things to prevail: (i) a
violation of a right that (ii) was clearly established at the time of the violation.
Ordinarily, a court does not decide a constitutional question if a nonconstitutional path is available.36 Accordingly, some judges believed that if
an alleged right was not clearly established, a court should dismiss the claim

on the Constitutional Rights of Federal Prisoners, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 409
(2019).
31
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
32
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
33
Id. at 589–90 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42). Where it is obvious that a
constitutional right exists, no precedent is necessary. See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52,
53–54 (2020) (per curiam) (concluding that under “extreme circumstances,” it can be
“obvious” that conduct is unconstitutional (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002))).
34
Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Qualified Immunity and Federalism, 109
GEO. L.J. 229, 231 (2020).
35
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
36
See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“‘It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.’” (quoting Burton v. United States, 196
U.S. 283, 295 (1905))).
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without deciding whether the alleged right actually exists.37 Yet if courts
always did that, then “constitutional stagnation” may result as some rights
might never become clearly established, especially in the context of new
technologies.38 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that the best way
to prevent constitutional stagnation is to impose an “order-of-operations”
rule requiring courts to always decide the constitutional question first.39
Saucier prompted much consternation among many judges who often have
sound reasons not to decide a constitutional question that is unnecessary to
the ultimate resolution of a case, especially in cases with poor briefing.40 In
Pearson, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled Saucier.41 Now, when
an alleged right is not clearly established, a court has discretion whether to
resolve the constitutional question going forward for the benefit of future
litigants or simply dismiss the claim and leave the law unsettled.42
In a pair of empirical studies, one of us (Nielson) examined how judges
exercise their discretion under Pearson.43 Among other findings, those
studies suggest that federal appellate judges appointed by Democratic
presidents may be more likely to award qualified immunity to the defendant
and clearly establish the law going forward in a way that makes clear that the
conduct at issue violates federal law.44 In contrast, federal appellate judges
appointed by Republican presidents may be more likely to dismiss the claim
on the ground that the right was not clearly established without proceeding
to reach the merits.45 But when Republican-appointed judges do use their
discretion to reach the constitutional question (at least when sitting together),
they may be more likely to issue alternative holdings—that the right was not
violated and, in any event, the right was not clearly established.46 Notably,
panels with a mix of judges exhibited “no statistically significant differences
37

See, e.g., Nielson & Walker, supra note 24, at 11–15.
See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (describing constitutional stagnation).
39
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
40
See, e.g., Nielson & Walker, supra note 24, at 17–19.
41
See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009), overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194 (2001).
42
See, e.g., id. at 236.
43
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 24; Nielson & Walker, supra note 18.
44
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 24, at 46–48. To be clear, the political party of the
nominating president is a very rough and imperfect proxy for understanding a judge’s views.
Nonetheless, because that characteristic is easy to identify and may have at least some
relationship with a judge’s views, the literature often relies on it.
45
See id. at 45–47.
46
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 18, at 109-10.
38
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as to either creating new constitutional rights or finding no constitutional
violation.”47
C. JUSTICE BARRETT’S CIVIL RIGHTS VIEWS

This Article does not speculate what Justice Barrett will do on the
Supreme Court. It is all too easy to make predictions only to have those
predictions turn out wrong.48 That said, the conventional wisdom is that
Barrett will hold different views from the late Justice Ginsburg on some
issues that fall within the umbrella of “civil rights.” In fact, Erwin
Chemerinsky stated that it will be “rare” for the Supreme Court to issue
decisions with a “liberal result” following Barrett’s confirmation.49
That view may be overstated. The Supreme Court is complicated; it
resolves many difficult cases, sometimes with surprising line-ups.50 Indeed,
qualified immunity’s two most aggressive critics are Justices Clarence
Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor who do not always agree in civil rights cases.51
Nevertheless, even if overstated, the conventional wisdom no doubt contains
at least some wisdom. Although it is hard to say what Justice Barrett will do

47

Id. at at 110.
See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, A Call for America’s Law Professors to Oppose CourtPacking, 2019 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2019)
48

The reality that Justices can be unpredictable is not new. Even aside from classic examples like
Justice William Brennan, whose appointment President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered a
mistake, Justices Harry Blackmun, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David Souter
did not always deliver results that the Presidents who appointed them would have endorsed. Most
recently, constitutional jurisprudence has not consistently resulted in conservative outcomes
despite the fact that Republican Presidents have appointed the majority of the current Supreme
Court.
49

Chemerinsky, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Is it a 3-3-3 Supreme Court? Barrett Opinion Gives
Goldman Sachs Partial Win in Class-Action Case, ABA J. (June 21, 2021, 1:35 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is-it-a-3-3-3-supreme-court-barrett-opinion-givesgoldman-sachs-partial-win-in-class-action-case/ [https://perma.cc/6XMV-AXZ7] (“Three
conservative justices—Neil M. Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito Jr.—did not
join the portion of Barrett’s ruling favoring the plaintiffs. The split is in keeping with other
opinions in which conservatives Roberts, Barrett and Kavanaugh are emerging as a more
moderate wing of the court . . . .”); Jonathan H. Adler, A New Five-Justice Block on the
Supreme Court?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 25, 2021, 10:41 AM), https:
//reason.com/volokh/2021/03/25/a-new-five-justice-block-on-the-supreme-court/
[https:
//perma.cc/2UU4-RRHU] (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court issued two significant
decisions today,” and “[i]n both decisions, the Chief Justice and Justice Kavanagh [sic] aligned
fully with the Court’s three liberal justices . . . .”).
51
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 34, at 231.
50
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in individual cases, it seems safe to say that her views generally will be closer
to Justice Scalia’s than Justice Ginsburg’s. When she accepted her
nomination to the Supreme Court, for example, Barrett stressed that Scalia
was her “mentor” and that his “judicial philosophy is mine, too.”52 Likewise,
on the Seventh Circuit, Barrett wrote a decision that suggests sympathy for a
broader reading of the Second Amendment than the one adopted by
Ginsburg.53 Further, since Barrett received the title “Justice,” she has joined
decisions suggesting she recognizes a more robust right to religious liberty
than Ginsburg did.54
II. GAMING CERTIORARI
The Supreme Court’s views about the law are important, but so are both
the preferences and the decisions of the lower courts. Relevant here, the
Supreme Court’s ability to decide cases often depends on how cases are
resolved in the lower courts. Attorneys file many more petitions for “cert”
than the Supreme Court has the ability to review, so the justices must decide
which cases merit their scarce time. The justices make that determination
through the certiorari process, which requires the Supreme Court to
determine whether a particular lower court decision is a good “vehicle” for
review.55 As we explain in Gaming Certiorari, it sometimes may be possible
for lower courts—fearing reversal—to deliberately make their decisions bad
52
President Donald Trump & Judge Amy Coney Barrett, Remarks by President Trump
Announcing His Nominee for Associate Justice of The Supreme Court of The United States
(Sept. 26, 2020) (transcript available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-announcing-nominee-associate-justice-supreme-courtunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/8DBM-MUJ8]).
53
See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting)
(“[A]lthough the right protected by the Second Amendment is not unlimited, its limits are not
defined by a general felon ban tied to a lack of virtue or good character.” (citation omitted)).
The idea that Justice Barrett is more likely to recognize a broader right to bear arms than
Justice Ginsburg would have is shared by those who opposed and supported her nomination.
Compare Carrie Johnson, Gun Control Groups Voice ‘Grave Concerns’ About Supreme Court
Nominee’s Record, NPR (Oct. 9, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/09/9217136
31/gun-control-groups-voice-grave-concerns-about-supreme-court-nominee-s-record [https:/
/perma.cc/E2DU-HMFR] (reporting concern) with Amy Swearer, Judge Amy Coney Barrett
Scares Gun-Control Advocates for the Right Reasons, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/judge-amy-coney-barrett-scares-gun-controladvocates-the-right-reasons [https://perma.cc/34R9-6FTD] (defending Barrett’s perceived
broad view).
54
See, e.g., Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam) (concluding
that the lower court erred by not enjoining Covid-related limits on religious activity).
55
See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Section II.B.
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“vehicles” for Supreme Court review. For purposes of this Article, we briefly
describe our model from Gaming Certiorari and identify its limits.
A. THE GAMING CERTIORARI MODEL

Gaming Certiorari develops a spatial model of judicial conduct in which
judges—both on the Supreme Court and the lower courts—acting within the
confines of a group attempt to make decisions. As the model is spatial rather
than formally mathematical, we depict each player’s perspective of “best
outcome” in terms of an “ideal point” located somewhere within the range of
possible outcomes. We first introduce the concept with a single-dimensional
analysis that omits transaction costs.56 In this single-dimensional analysis,
each player’s ideal outcome appears as a single point on a spectrum; for
example, one might evaluate possible resolutions of qualified immunity cases
solely based on their location on a spectrum between no-liability and liability
outcomes:

56

Because our model is a single-iteration game, all figures are case-specific. Thus, a single
judge’s view of the best outcome depends entirely on the nature of the underlying alleged
constitutional or statutory right at issue in that specific case. Our model does not address how
a judge decides what is the “best” outcome, though we believe notions of legal correctness
should constrain a judge’s view of what is “best.” See generally id. at Part IV.
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Figure 1 depicts the ideal points of a hypothetical Supreme Court,
identified as points CJ (for the Chief Justice) and J2-J9 (for the remaining
eight justices, in decreasing order of seniority). Figure 1 also depicts the
inherited result Ri. This point represents the status quo against which each
justice must evaluate each case to determine if he or she should vote in favor
of certiorari. In the simplified “blank slate” or “case of first impression”
scenario we explore here, point Ri thus represents the location of the result
generated by the lower court.57
A player maximizes her utility if the court’s decision falls precisely at
that player’s ideal point, and each player’s utility for any other outcome is
essentially the inverse of the distance between that outcome and the player’s
ideal point.58 Accordingly, in a single-dimensional world without transaction
57

In later figures, we replace the term Ri with the term LC’. Point LC represents the lower
court’s own ideal point; point LC’ in turn represents the lower court’s optimal strategic
response to the preferences (and eventually the transaction costs) of the justices of the
Supreme Court.
58
For ease of illustration, we make the simplifying assumption that each player’s utility
is defined as the inverse of the distance between her ideal point and the outcome being
considered, regardless of directionality. For example, in a single-dimensional analysis based
on a linear “liberal to conservative” spectrum, a justice would regard an outcome x units to
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costs, the Supreme Court will grant certiorari when at least four justices
anticipate an improvement from Pi if they take the case.59
As Gaming Certiorari explains, even a single-dimensional analysis
yields some potentially surprising and counterintuitive results.60 Many
petitions for certiorari, however, involve two or more potential dimensions.
For example, in the context of qualified immunity, individual judges or
justices may have one view as to whether the constitutional rights regime in
question should be based upon bright-line rules or case-specific standards,
and another potentially competing set of preferences with respect to whether
the particular defendant should face liability.61 To demonstrate the
implications of a multidimensional game, our model also depicts a twodimensional range of outcomes:

the left of her ideal point as having identical utility to an outcome x units to the right of her
ideal point. No doubt, the real world is more complicated, but that complication simply makes
the analysis harder, rather than defeating the conceptual value of the model. See Nielson &
Stancil, supra note 7, at Section II.A.
59
Figure 1 reflects just such a situation, because a bloc of six justices (CJ, plus J2, J4, J7,
J8, and J9) all could improve the outcome in a new case relative to the inherited outcome; that
is, this coalition of six justices could craft a majority opinion better from each of their
individual perspectives than Ri.
60
See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Section II.A.2.
61
Different judges, for example, may have different views about whether “even a bad rule
is better than no rule at all.” Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1179 (1989); cf. Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1836 (2021) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment) (“I reluctantly conclude that I must accept [a case I disagree with]
in this case because to do otherwise would create further confusion and division about whether
state laws prohibiting reckless assault satisfy the elements clause.”). Note, we model
preferences for “liability versus no liability” as a continuum because although the actual final
determination will necessarily be binary (the plaintiff will either win or lose), both judicial
views as to the issue and the effective rule established by any Supreme Court decision can and
likely will be non-binary. Further, we do not claim that these are the only possible dimensions.
We use these two dimensions for illustrative purposes, especially because the math gets very
complicated when using three or more dimensions. We also do not address how a judge
reaches a preference.
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In Figure 2-A, three hypothetical justices (J3, J5, and J6) have a
relatively strong preference for standards over rules and lean against liability.
However, four other hypothetical justices (J4, J7, J8, and J9) have a slightly
stronger preference for rules and lean more strongly toward liability. CJ and
J2 are outliers. The hypothetical Chief Justice prefers standards to rules but
prefers liability at a level between the two blocs. By contrast, J2 prefers rules
to standards more than any other justice. J2’s liability preferences also lie in
the middle, closest to the Chief Justice’s.
The general approach to analyzing a two-dimensional certiorari game is
the same as in the one-dimensional context, albeit slightly more complicated.
As in the single-dimensional context, the goal is to determine whether a
certiorari grant that results in a majority opinion will improve the positions
of at least four justices.62 As before, the model defines each justice’s utility

62
Certiorari is granted on the affirmative vote of four justices; accordingly, certiorari will
be granted if at least four justices anticipate a better outcome (from their perspective) of the
resulting five-or-greater justice majority in a merits decision. See Nielson & Stancil, supra
note 7, at Part I.B.
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for a given outcome by the absolute distance between that outcome and the
justice’s ideal point. However, because a two-dimensional analysis involves
potential tradeoffs between the dimensions, predicting the outcome of a
certiorari petition is more difficult:

Figure 2-B adds to the model both the circular zones of potential
outcomes that would represent an improvement relative to the inherited
outcome from each justice’s perspective and what we call a “Pareto
improvement zone”—an area in which any result would represent an
improvement for a coalition of five justices.63 The Pareto improvement zone
in Figure 2-B is shaded gray, which is obtained by intersecting the five circles
around points J2, J4, J7, J8, and J9. Because each of those circles intersects
the inherited result Ri, any point closer to a justice’s ideal point than on her
respective circle represents an improvement from her perspective. By
63
We assume for simplicity that each justice weights each dimension equally, which
allows the use of circles rather than more complex shapes. Again, although this assumption
likely abstracts away from reality in many cases, it does not affect the power of the model to
deliver insights into the certiorari game. See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Section II.A.3.
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identifying the intersection of the five listed circles, we identify the policy
space within which that five-justice coalition could together obtain a result
each regards as superior to the inherited result. Accordingly, in a twodimensional world without transaction costs, the Supreme Court will vote to
grant certiorari if four justices can reliably predict a better outcome than Ri
in a merits decision.64
Figure 3 adds two additional components into the mix—the “transaction
costs”65 facing the justices and the absolute preferences of the lower court
(labeled LC):

64

Some two-dimensional preference mappings may contain more than one potential
“minimum winning coalition” that could see a Pareto improvement from the inherited result.
In Figure 2-B itself, there are at least two other minimum winning coalitions consisting of the
Chief Justice and other combinations of the four justices on the right side of the figure. But
for reasons we explain more fully in Gaming Certiorari, the minimum winning coalitions
involving the Chief Justice in Figure 2-B would not carry the day, in large part because the
J2-J4-J7-J8-J9 coalition would be “stronger” than any coalition the Chief Justice could cobble
together. See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Part II.A.3.
65
By “transaction costs,” we mean all costs a justice must incur as part of deciding a
particular case on the merits. See id. at Section II.B.1. This includes each justice’s opportunity
costs (effectively a measure of how important the case in question is to that Justice relative to
all other matters on the Supreme Court’s docket) as well as error costs (the risk-adjusted
expected cost of making a mistake), bargaining costs (the effort and political and/or
interpersonal capital expended to negotiate a merits outcome), and search and information
costs (the costs to each justice of obtaining the information they need to make informed
decisions).
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In this figure, dashed circles replace the solid circles and represent the
transaction costs facing each justice. In our model, each justice still has an
ideal point representing her preferences in a cost-free world. The dashed
circle centered upon her ideal point represents her personal indifference
curve once we account for her transaction costs. Thus, although the
hypothetical Chief Justice here would still prefer an outcome precisely at
point CJ if she does not have to do any work to make it happen, she is
ultimately indifferent as between point CJ and any other point on or within
the black dashed circle surrounding CJ when she considers her transaction
costs. Put slightly differently, while the Chief Justice might still prefer CJ to
any other outcome, she will not take action to improve the result if it lies on
or within her transaction cost circle.
Point LC represents the lower court’s ideal point. In a world without
transaction costs, the lower court’s ideal point is often irrelevant because any
decision outside the minimum winning coalition’s mutual Pareto
improvement zone will yield a certiorari grant and an outcome on or within
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that boundary. Transaction costs may change the equation, however.66 The
basic model’s upshot is that lower courts, in theory, can take advantage of
both each justice’s multidimensional preferences and each justice’s own
transaction costs to craft outcomes that may evade review despite the
existence of a coalition of five or more justices that could otherwise use the
petition to improve upon the inherited outcome. Moreover, as Gaming
Certiorari explains, lower court judges have at least some ability to create
transaction costs for the justices. For example, they may issue unpublished
opinions with alternative holdings and little analysis that do not finally
resolve the case, but instead remand for further analysis. Each of these factors
is generally understood to make a case a relatively worse “vehicle” for
certiorari.67
Figure 3 assumes that the depicted transaction costs are the result of
lower court “cert-proofing.”68 In a world without transaction costs, the lower
court would not be able to write an opinion at its ideal point LC without
prompting Supreme Court review. However, given the hypothetical certproofing transaction costs we posit, the lower court in Figure 3 can safely
write precisely at LC. This is because there is no minimum winning coalition
of justices willing to incur the transaction costs associated with a cert grant
and merits opinion given the predicted outcome of a cert grant.69
B. LIMITS OF OUR MODEL

To be clear, our model has limits. After all, all models of human
behavior depend on simplifying assumptions that make such models
reductionist to some degree. Here, our assumptions may diverge from reality
in several ways. For example, as with many game theoretical models, we
assume each player attempts to maximize her own preferences and knows
66

Because lower courts either hear appeals of right (e.g., most cases before federal circuit
courts of appeal) or have already sunk their transaction costs (e.g., discretionary review in
state courts of last resort), their transaction costs for purposes of our analysis are effectively
zero. That no doubt is also an oversimplification but is not ultimately relevant to the analysis
here.
67
See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Sections I.B.1, II.B.3.
68
See supra fig.3.
69
If the Supreme Court decides to grant review—for whatever reason—the justices’
transaction costs are no longer relevant. Thus, if the lower court were to write an opinion
outside a sufficient number of transaction cost boundaries, two things would happen. First, the
Supreme Court would grant certiorari. Second, the outcome would be as we described above
in the text discussing a zero-transaction-cost world. Thus, for the lower court’s opinion to be
cert-proof in this hypothetical, it need only fall in a location that will draw three or fewer votes
for certiorari from the zero-transaction-costs winning coalition. That means it needs to be
inside or on at least two of that winning coalition’s transaction cost boundaries.
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both the ideal points and the transaction costs facing every other player. This
may not always be accurate. As a result, some lower courts may not engage
in the calculus we suggest, and even those that do might get things wrong.
Moreover, some judges and justices may be playing a longer game (i.e.,
thinking about a series of cases over time rather than a single case), such that
our single-iteration model fails to capture relevant longitudinal incentives.
Relatedly, as noted above, it is possible that cases involve more than one or
two potential competing dimensions, and it is likely that multi-dimensional
cases involve different relative preference intensities for each dimension (and
possibly for each judge or justice). Finally, the model is limited by
epistemological limitations on the quality of its inputs—it often will be
difficult if not impossible to identify specific ideal points for each player, and
it will often be even harder to quantify each player’s transaction costs
accurately.70
For these reasons (and likely for other reasons related to other
simplifying assumptions we make), our model is not intended to make
precise, fine-grained outcome predictions, especially because lower courts
operate in panels, which influences how those courts decide cases. Rather,
we designed the model to illustrate the dynamics associated with the
certiorari decision and the role the lower courts can play in that process.
III. JUSTICE BARRETT AND CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER
COURTS
So long as lower courts disagree with the Supreme Court, judges may
be tempted to try to cert-proof their decisions. As explained above, this does
not mean that every judge will do so, nor that it is even possible to do so for
every case—sometimes an issue is so obviously important that certiorari is
essentially a foregone conclusion.71 But when a lower court and the Supreme
Court disagree, the temptation to evade review may arise, even if lower
courts do not act upon that temptation. Thus, Justice Barrett’s confirmation
provides a unique opportunity to explore conceptually the relationship
70
In fact, taken to its extreme, the model suggests that the Supreme Court will rarely (if
ever) grant certiorari, because it always has the lower court placing the opinion in the location
that maximizes the lower court’s utility while being insulated from Supreme Court review.
Obviously, that does not match reality.
71
See, e.g., Benjamin Johnson, The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology and
the Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and Shape Law, 50 CONN. L. REV. 581, 589
(2018) (explaining that some petitions are “so overwhelmingly important” that it is obvious
that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari and that, indeed, it would be “irresponsible” to
deny review).
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between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. Barrett, after all, replaced
the late Justice Ginsburg, in what may be one of the most significant shifts in
decades.72 Because Barrett and Ginsburg almost certainly view some issues
differently, other judges no doubt perceive the Supreme Court as being more
or less hospitable to certain types of decisions relating to those issues.
This Section uses our model to demonstrate how lower courts
sometimes may respond to Justice Barrett’s confirmation, with particular
focus on cert-proofing. Then, we explore a specific cert-proofing tool that
may be used in qualified immunity cases: Pearson discretion.
A. THE DYNAMIC EFFECT OF JUSTICE BARRETT’S
CONFIRMATION

Gaming Certiorari attempts to explore the general relationship between
the lower courts and Supreme Court. Here, however, we use our model for a
different purpose: to consider what Justice Barrett’s confirmation may mean
for civil rights litigation involving qualified immunity. 73 Our model suggests
that, all else being equal, we should expect more cases at the margins in
which lower court judges attempt to evade review, at least if they hold views
closer to Justice Ginsburg’s than Barrett’s. Similarly, judges who hold views
closer to Barrett’s may, at the margins, be less inclined to use cert-proofing
tools.
In particular, in Figures 4 and 5, we use our Gaming Certiorari model
to develop a plausible mapping of the justice’s views in connection with a
hypothetical Free Exercise case (i.e., a case implicating the First
72
See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Barrett Could Be Ginsburg’s Polar Opposite On Supreme
Court, AP NEWS (Sept. 27, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ruth-bader-ginsburg-us-suprem
e-court-courts-gun-politics-antonin-scalia-726bd0316cd646927b93137575c92966
[https://perma.cc/JRP2-8H5R] (“[T]he replacement of the liberal icon Ginsburg . . . by
Barrett . . . would represent the most dramatic ideological change on the Supreme Court in
nearly 30 years . . . .”); Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: If Ginsburg Leaves it Could be
the Liberals’ Biggest Loss Yet – A Look Back at Previous Justices Replaced with More
Conservative Successors, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 17, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://www.scotusblog
.com/2019/01/empirical-scotus-if-ginsburg-leaves-it-could-be-the-liberals-biggest-loss-yeta-look-back-at-previous-justices-replaced-with-more-conservative-successors/ [https://perma
.cc/K7BD-UVJB] (explaining that “[i]f Trump fills Ginsburg’s seat . . . the trajectory of the
Court, in terms of both case selection and adjudication, could very well look nothing like what
we have seen in the past”).
73
See Nielson & Walker, supra note 18, at 119–20 (urging the Supreme Court to pay
greater attention to panel composition in qualified immunity cases and less attention to
whether a decision is published); see also Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and
Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 143 (2009) (predicting strategic behavior).
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Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause) while Justice Ginsburg was still on the
Court, and then with Justice Barrett. This model uses the Free Exercise
context because the Court’s approach to this issue already appears to have
changed at least somewhat in a conservative direction after Barrett’s
confirmation.74 This model uses individual justices’ initials (e.g., “SS” for
Sonia Sotomayor, “CT” for “Clarence Thomas,” etc.) in lieu of generic
seniority-based labels to explore the effects of the Barrett-for-Ginsburg
substitution. Because the Chief Justice’s status provides him with special
power in the game, we have retained the label “CJ.” To be clear, however,
our mapping is hypothetical and is not based on specific cases or judicial
opinions because it is impossible to know for certain how each of the justices
would view the legal question. In other words, our mapping is illustrative and
is not intended to be a perfect representation of reality.
First, consider a case with Justice Ginsburg and a cert-proofing lower
court whose ideal point includes a moderately stronger preference for rules
over standards than the preferences of the “liberal” justices, and a
substantially stronger preference against liability than the “conservative”
justices75:

74
We use “liberal” and “conservative” because the terms are so commonly used in the
public discourse but recognize and even emphasize that such terms often cloud more than
clarify.
75
One downside of using this context is that it is (somewhat) unusual: the conservatives
may be more willing to side with the plaintiff in a Free Exercise case than the liberals, whereas
in other contexts it may be the liberals who are more willing to side with the plaintiff. This
may affect which “cert proofing” tools are available, including the role that Pearson discretion
can play. Nonetheless, the authors elected to use the Free Exercise context because the
difference between the opinions of Justice Ginsburg and Justice Barrett have already begun to
manifest. See Trump & Barrett, supra note 54.
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A lower court that wishes to establish the rule somewhere other than at
point CJ can increase each justice’s transaction costs through the use of
certain tools (e.g., an unpublished opinion, a ruling on alternative grounds, a
fact-bound opinion, etc.). This model depicts those transaction costs as a dash
centered upon each relevant justice’s ideal point. The basic idea is that once
the model factors in transaction costs, a justice who considers whether to vote
in favor of certiorari when facing a lower court opinion on or inside her
transaction-cost boundary will conclude that to decide that particular case is
not worth her time.76
Accordingly, in Figure 4, the lower court can place its decision at point
LC’ without risk of Supreme Court review.77 Although that point lies outside
three conservative justices’ hypothetical transaction-cost boundaries, it falls
76
As we explain in Gaming Certiorari, not every justice will face the same transaction
cost function in connection with every case. See generally Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at
Section II.B.
77
In Figures 4 and 5, we use the labels LC’ and LC’’ to identify the locations of final
policies with Justice Ginsburg and Justice Barrett on the Court, respectively.
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inside the Chief Justice’s boundary and on Justice Kavanaugh’s boundary.
Even though Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Alito would be willing to vote
in favor of certiorari in response to an opinion at Pf, they could not obtain the
fourth vote; the lower court’s opinion is therefore cert-proof at that location.
The dynamics change when we replace Justice Ginsburg with Justice
Barrett. In Figure 5, we depict that hypothetical outcome:

In a world without transaction costs, Justice Barrett’s confirmation
would have had enormous effects. With no transaction costs to confound the
justices, any lower court result outside the irregular pentagon formed by the
ideal points of the five-justice conservative majority would have produced
both a certiorari grant and an outcome on or within that pentagon. But with
transaction costs, the result is different.78
78
Given both the assumptions and the limitations of our analysis, it is not possible to
predict the precise outcome in this scenario. If the Chief Justice chooses not to join the
majority opinion, he would cede opinion assignment power to Justice Thomas, who could
effectively insist upon an opinion written precisely at his own ideal point (whether he assigns
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In this hypothetical, the substitution of Justice Barrett for Justice
Ginsburg likely will have some impact, even in a world with transaction
costs. But the extent of that impact likely could be different than many
commentators believe because, at least in theory and perhaps at the margins
in reality, the availability of cert-proofing tools might allow lower courts that
disagree with the perceived views of the new Supreme Court to protect their
opinions from review, at least to some extent.
Accordingly, Figure 5 suggests a cert-proof opinion at point LC’’. To
be sure, the shift from Ginsburg to Barrett has an impact—the lower court’s
closest “safe” result lies somewhat to the right with Barrett on the Court.
Nonetheless, the lower court’s cert-proofing efforts bear fruit when
comparing a cert-proof outcome at LC’’ to a no-transaction cost outcome that
would be somewhere far to the right, in the thicket of ideal points associated
with the conservative justice bloc that includes Barrett. In other words, to the
extent our model sometimes may reflect reality, the law will shift even
without a Supreme Court decision, but the law will not shift as much as it
would in a world without transaction costs—especially not as much as it
would in a world where lower court judges cannot deliberately increase
transaction costs.
B. PEARSON DISCRETION AND CERT-PROOFING

For reasons explained above, Justice Barrett’s confirmation may
increase the temptation for some judges to use cert-proofing tools more, and
for other judges to use them less. To the extent that judges ever succumb to
those temptations, we should expect them to use ordinary cert-proofing tools
(e.g., unpublished opinions, alternative holdings, remand, etc.) either more
or less. Whatever one’s views of cert-proofing, this is a potential
development to monitor.79
Qualified immunity, however, has a unique cert-proofing tool: Pearson
discretion. To the extent that lower court judges believe that the Supreme
Court is less likely to grant certiorari in a case where qualified immunity is
awarded than otherwise, some judges may be more inclined to grant
immunity while clearly establishing the law for the future. Likewise, judges
the opinion to himself or not). If the Chief Justice chooses to join the majority in a way that
allows him to retain opinion assignment authority (e.g., by voting in favor of liability), the
ultimate outcome may change somewhat, though the Chief Justice could not write a majority
opinion at his own ideal point.
79
See Nielson & Stancil, supra note 7, at Part IV (explaining the costs “cert proofing”
imposes but also noting that others may disagree).
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who previously might have simply issued a decision that awarded qualified
immunity but did not clearly establish the law one way or the other, may be
inclined to use their discretion to recognize the right in a way that they
believe reflects the new Supreme Court majority’s views. Such strategic uses
of discretion may counsel in favor of further refinement of Pearson,
including a reason-giving requirement.80
CONCLUSION
Justice Barrett’s confirmation to the Supreme Court is significant. It is
safe to say that replacing Justice Ginsburg with Barrett will change how the
Supreme Court decides at least some cases. The Supreme Court, however, is
not an island. Because the Supreme Court is part of a dynamic system, judges
on lower courts can anticipate what the justices are likely to do and then
adjust accordingly.
This Article used game theory to examine what Justice Barrett’s
confirmation could mean for how the lower courts decide civil rights cases.
This Article’s predictions, of course, are only good as our model—and our
model has significant limitations. Nonetheless, our model predicts that lower
court judges who disagree with the new Supreme Court majority will face
stronger incentives to use cert-proofing tools, and that those who agree with
it will have less incentives to do so. And of particular relevance here, our
model predicts that lower court judges who disagree with the new Supreme
Court majority will confront stronger incentives to use their Pearson
discretion to clearly establish the law going forward while ruling against the
plaintiffs before them. In most cases, none of this will matter and the
judiciary will act the same as before. In some cases, however, lower court
behavior may change. In short, Justice Barrett’s confirmation may let the
public better understand the judiciary as a whole.

80

See Nielson & Walker, supra note 18, at 119 (urging the Supreme Court to adopt a
reason-giving requirement for use of discretion in qualified immunity cases).

